The conquerors tried to superimpose their ideas and culture on the previous ones of the gown, but did not succeed.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
The Issue of Dual Nationality in Contemporary China
The Issue of Dual Nationality in Contemporary China
by Dong Hao
UCV2206 Chinese Thought and Culture
Sep 2008
In recent years, many newly immigrated overseas Chinese have been calling for dual nationality so that they can keep their Chinese citizenship while obtaining a foreign one. According to one survey by the torontoservice.com website and the North Chinese Community of Canada in 2003, 92.6% of the overseas Chinese thought that if the Chinese government accepted the dual citizenship, they would retain their Chinese citizenship. These newly immigrated Chinese were in a dilemma. On one hand, they do not want to cut off their connection with their cultural root in China; on the other hand, for pragmatic reasons, they need to accept a foreign citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new country.
In 2005, the China Democratic National Construction Association submitted a proposal to the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top advisory body, to suggest the acceptance of dual nationality by the government. However, these efforts did not change the CCP government’s policy regarding dual nationality. “China does not recognize dual nationality because the country cares for the interests of the majority of the overseas Chinese (referred to overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia)” , said Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. However, in order to understand why PRC set this kind of policy, we need to understand as well the historical context in which this policy was made. This article argues that due to the great change in the perception of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia towards China as a nation, it is more practical for the Chinese government to consider more about the pursuit of those newly immigrated Chinese, especially that of Chinese overseas students.
A short introduction of Nationality Law
“Nationality” is defined as “Condition or status of belonging to, or having legality with a nation or state” by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In Encyclopedia Britannica, “nationality” is described simply as “By law, a membership in one nation or sovereign state” Nowadays, different countries grant nationality based on different criteria, which can be categorized mainly into three.
1. Jus soli (birthright citizenship), is a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state. The countries adopting this criterion include Canada, India, Australia, Argentina, and Chile.
2. Jus Sanguinis (blood citizenship), is a social policy by which nationality or citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who is a national or citizen of the state. The countries adopting this criterion include Germany, Australia, Romania, Egypt and Russia.
3. Mixed criterion, is a flexible policy combining the two criteria mentioned above together. The countries adopt this criterion includes Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, France (more on Jus Sanguinis) and USA, UK, Philippine, Indonesia (more on Jus Soli).
“Dual nationality” is the status in which a person is concurrently regarded as citizen under the laws of more than one state. According to the data provided by multiplecitizenship.com, 74 out of the total 192 countries or regions prohibit dual nationality, which means that 61.5% of the countries or regions permit dual nationality, including USA, Canada, and most European countries.
Historical Background of the Rejection of Dual Nationality
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there passed three nationality laws in history, which are the Law of Nationality of Qing Dynasty (1909), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1912), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1929). All of them recognized dual nationality and treated the overseas Chinese as their legal citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis. One interesting thing is that nowadays Taiwan (the Republic of China) is still issuing passport to overseas Chinese on the basis of the principle of jus sanguinis, irrespective of whether they have lived or even set foot in Taiwan. This policy was considered as a reward for the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia due to their support in anti-Japanese war.
However, after World War II, the Western retreat from Southeast Asia was accompanied by the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. There, nationalism against the west was turned into forces and new citizens could not tolerate any involvement of the foreign nationalism in their newly independent country. The success of the Communist Party in China’s civil war could only make things worse, for some local communities in Southeast Asia suspect the overseas Chinese to be the spies of the Communist China. Moreover, the western countries dominated by the United States also rendered the existence of large populations of overseas Chinese as evidence of the “China Threat”. Severe anti-Chinese movements appeared in Southeast Asia, which not only caused trouble for the overseas Chinese but also became a great obstacle for the New China to build regular relationships with these third-world countries.
After evaluating the situation, CCP government eventually decided to deny the dual nationality and encouraged the overseas Chinese to be involved with local communities and participate in local affairs. In the first Asia-African Conference 1955, which was held in Bandung, Indonesia, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed the Dual treaty with Indonesia, in which Chinese government officially gave up the principle of jus soli and let the overseas Chinese to decide which nationality they want to keep. Although small groups of Chinese chose to return to China or remigrate somewhere else, the majority, however, decided to accept the citizenship in these newly established countries and were determined to make their peace with local nationalism.
The “Migrant Upgrading” of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries
In the past fifty years since the CCP government showed clearly its stance of rejecting dual nationality, great changes have occurred in the minds of the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asian Countries about the perspective of national identity and feeling towards China, especially by the new generation. This change is named “Migrant Upgrading” by Wang Gungwu, the renowned former director of the Institute of the Asian studies in Singapore. In the article Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren, he lists the changing national identities of the overseas Chinese in some specific Southeast Asia countries.
In Thailand, the most thorough and penetrating migrant upgrading happened. There the question of Chinese descent among Thai nationals has been of minimal concern, even in politics and military. There are no Huaqiao left and even the term Huaren, or ethnic Chinese is argued by some as inappropriate. In Singapore, over 75 percent of the population is of Chinese descent, but they are now all Singaporeans, and some even question the need for a term like Huaren. Filipinos include millions of nationals of Chinese and part-Chinese descent, many of whom consider themselves first and foremost Filipinos. Only in non-political and non-military professions and business activities, they will consider the use of Huaren. In Malaysia and Indonesia, although the upgrading is incomplete, the Chinese descent there consider themselves more as ethnic Chinese, or Huaren, rather than the term related to nationality, Huaqiao.
In short, although in different countries the experience of “Migrant Upgrading” is different, generally majority of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia tend to be more involved in their own country’s affairs and have little affinity towards China as a nation.
Two causes may contribute to the “Migrant Upgrading” in this region. One is more integration or assimilation in their adopted nations, caused by various factors such as pragmatic economic benefits and government’s policies.
The other one is less obvious but of significant influence and that is the vagueness of the Chinese culture center after the establishment of PRC. Before 1949, China continuously provides cultural centers at different times and they were Beijing (in Qing dynasty), Nanjing and Shanghai (in Zhonghua MInguo). These cultural centers served as vivid cultural entities to attract the attention of the overseas Chinese and unite them, just like what Mecca is to the Muslims around the world. But after the China’s civil war, the complicated political situation and ideological differences gave rise to the vagueness of the cultural center. Beijing is not the former capital of Qing Empire, but the center of a Communist country, which promotes the complete elimination of the “toxic” Chinese traditional culture. The majority of the overseas Chinese, except for the leftists, felt disappointed in the Communist party. Although in Taiwan the former ROC government still claims its orthodoxy and sovereignty, to many overseas Chinese this island is too small to hold the whole bulk of Chinese culture. To the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, ambiguity of the cultural center aboard was replaced by the overwhelming domestic political and economic issues. Communal struggle and suffering in a stagnant environment with few new immigrants, creates awareness of togetherness and common destiny.
Fifty years can change many things. Nowadays, although they have a desire to preserve their Chineseness, or status of cultural Chinese, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those groups of Huaqiao or Chinese sojourners, who have close relations and perceptions with China as a nation. The new phenomenon of the remigration of these overseas Chinese to North America, Europe and Australia rather than their ancestral homeland, described by Tu Wei-ming as “the transformation from sojourner mentality to deliberate emigration”, is another example for the perplexing feeling of Southeast Asian Chinese towards China.
Thus, if the Chinese government still considers the rejection of dual nationality as a protection to the Southeast Asian Chinese as claimed by its director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, it is far from the correct evaluation of the situation and also of itself, for China as a nation in fact has little influence on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. If we just concentrate on the nationality issue, the influence becomes even smaller, as even if China accept the dual nationality, the one-nationality policy adopted by ASEAN countries inhibits their citizens from getting another nationality.
The Community most Affected by Issues of Dual Nationality
Compared with the old batch of overseas Chinese living in the Southeast Asia, nowadays there is another community of overseas Chinese that is worth the government’s attention. They are the newly immigrated overseas Chinese, mainly made up by the overseas Chinese students after 1978. They urge to see the development of China and since China is where they grow up in, they have more personal connections with this country.
In 1978, the year after Cultural Revolution, the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to send students and scholars overseas for further education each year. With this policy, the Chinese government aimed to rebuild China’s scientific community, which was catastrophically reduced in the Cultural Revolution. However, with China’s booming economy and open-door policy, the 1990s saw a great surge of the self-sponsored Chinese overseas students. In 2002, 117 thousands of self-sponsored students went overseas, making up 94% of the total overseas students for that year. The graph below shows more vividly the increase.
According to one project done by Linqing Yao at the Australian National University, the total population of Chinese overseas students is about 700,000 from 1978 to 2003, among which 527,000 did not return back to China and chose to stay overseas. In order to find out the reasons that contributed to the high percentage of non-returners, a survey was carried out in United States in 1993, which showed that more than 30 per cent of non-returners were concerned about political instability, while another 30 percent emphasized professional problems in China, such as low salaries, poor research facilities and difficulties changing jobs.
Despite the various reasons that let them choose to stay overseas, these groups of Chinese overseas students care about the current development of China much more than the old batch of overseas Chinese. They actively get involved in the activities related to China with the slogan of “Serve the Country without Returning”, and enthusiastically defend China’s image when their country is in trouble. The recent confrontation of the pro-China Chinese students with the pro-Tibet westerners during the Olympic torch relay is a vivid example of the heated nationalism shared among the overseas students. Comparably, the old batch of overseas Chinese, especially Southeast Asia, has less concern for China’s situation. A research project conducted by Prof David Zweig, head of the Center on China’s Transnational Relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, provides plenty of data to show that the overseas Chinese students are “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad” and “a significant proportion of them believe that using force to promote China’s national interest is acceptable”. It is a glaring fact that the large portions of the overseas Chinese students have strong cultural and family ties with the country, and that they are willing to contribute to its development.
However, for pragmatic benefits such as medical insurance and traveling convenience, many overseas Chinese need to acquire another citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new countries. The rejection of dual nationality by the Chinese government gives them the hardship of having to make a choice. They are the ones with a significant psychological bond to China. They are the ones who care most about the dual nationality issue.
Conclusion
On 22 December, 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a bill to accept dual citizenship in order to attract the investment from the 25 million Indian diasporas. On Aug 30, 2008, the Korean government reduced the standard of acquiring the dual citizenship in order to attract more talented overseas Korean and foreigners. Nowadays, more and more governments are aware of the importance of attracting talents and brain-power. The overseas Chinese students form a large pool of overseas human capital. The acceptance of dual nationality can efficiently reduce the effects of a “brain drain” and encourage more overseas Chinese to invest domestically. Besides, the psychological and cultural impact will also be strong, considering the deep-rooted awareness of “root” shared by all the Chinese.
Without a doubt, side effects and negative influences need to be considered to change one policy. But now is the time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the identity of the different groups of overseas Chinese and concentrate on those who have more affinity to China as a nation. We need to admit that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia also had great nationalism for supporting China repulse the Japanese invaders in 1940s. But time has changed and nowadays, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those same groups of Chinese nationalists. They belong to their own countries and are striving for their own rights in their adopted motherland. In contrast, since 1978, the overseas Chinese students have already formed a new group of overseas Chinese, who deserve a reevaluation of China’s policies about dual nationality. Compared with the old batch, they are more aware of China’s development because that is the land where they have grown up in. As the proverb goes, “Chasing two rabbits at the same time will cause both escape!” It is time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the situation and its role in the dual nationality matter in order to make a policy that can most benefit the country and its people.
References:
1. David Zweig and Stanley Rosen, ‘How China Trained a New Generation Abroad’, 2003. At: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html
2. Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles”, Newsweek, Aug 9, 2008
3. David Mozingo. ‘The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty.’ Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 10 (Dec., 1961), p. 25-31
4. “Dual Nationality Called among Overseas Chinese”. At: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/08/content_398383.htm
5. “韩政府将扩大双重国籍拥有对象范围-朝鲜日报”At: http://chn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/08/30/20080830000014.html
6. “华人移民好消息 我国拟承认双重国籍”, At: http://abroad.163.com/editor/immigration/040924/040924_28203.html
7. M.B Hooker, Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. p176
8. “National Law of the Republic of China”. At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_nationality_law#Overseas_Chinese_without_right_of_abode
9. "nationality." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Sep. 2008
10. “Nationality Joy for Overseas Indians” At:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2643149.stm
11. “Not Recognizing Dual Nationality is for the Sake of Most Overseas Compatriots”. At: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/09/eng20050609_189401.html
12. “Proposal submitted for dual nationality”. At: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t187211.htm
13. “双重国籍问题再思考”. At: http://english.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1104065.htm
14. Tu Wei-ming, The Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Beijing Chinese Today, Stanford University Press, 1994. p24
15. Vincent, Andrew (2002). Nationalism and Particularity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. Wang Gungwu. ‘Introduction: Migration and New National Identity.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
17. Wang Gungwu, ‘Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren’, In The Last Half Century of Chinese overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
18. 王庚武. ‘海外华人的文化中心.’移民与崛起中的中国. 新加坡：世界科技出版公司 2005
19. 王辉耀. 海归时代 中国:中央编译出版社 2004
20. 王锦松.’ 中国双重国籍问题探索.’ 联合早报，11 Dec 1997.
21. 蕭成洽. 碩士論文：我國國籍法制與實施現狀之研究 銘傳大學June 2005. P53
22. “一九五五年万隆会议” At: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-26/16501621044.shtml
23. Yao Linqing. The Chinese Overseas Students: an Overview of the Flows Change. The Australian National University, 2004. p1
24. Zhou Nanjing. ‘The Xiao Yucan Principle and its Historical Destiny.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
by Dong Hao
UCV2206 Chinese Thought and Culture
Sep 2008
In recent years, many newly immigrated overseas Chinese have been calling for dual nationality so that they can keep their Chinese citizenship while obtaining a foreign one. According to one survey by the torontoservice.com website and the North Chinese Community of Canada in 2003, 92.6% of the overseas Chinese thought that if the Chinese government accepted the dual citizenship, they would retain their Chinese citizenship. These newly immigrated Chinese were in a dilemma. On one hand, they do not want to cut off their connection with their cultural root in China; on the other hand, for pragmatic reasons, they need to accept a foreign citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new country.
In 2005, the China Democratic National Construction Association submitted a proposal to the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top advisory body, to suggest the acceptance of dual nationality by the government. However, these efforts did not change the CCP government’s policy regarding dual nationality. “China does not recognize dual nationality because the country cares for the interests of the majority of the overseas Chinese (referred to overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia)” , said Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. However, in order to understand why PRC set this kind of policy, we need to understand as well the historical context in which this policy was made. This article argues that due to the great change in the perception of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia towards China as a nation, it is more practical for the Chinese government to consider more about the pursuit of those newly immigrated Chinese, especially that of Chinese overseas students.
A short introduction of Nationality Law
“Nationality” is defined as “Condition or status of belonging to, or having legality with a nation or state” by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In Encyclopedia Britannica, “nationality” is described simply as “By law, a membership in one nation or sovereign state” Nowadays, different countries grant nationality based on different criteria, which can be categorized mainly into three.
1. Jus soli (birthright citizenship), is a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state. The countries adopting this criterion include Canada, India, Australia, Argentina, and Chile.
2. Jus Sanguinis (blood citizenship), is a social policy by which nationality or citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who is a national or citizen of the state. The countries adopting this criterion include Germany, Australia, Romania, Egypt and Russia.
3. Mixed criterion, is a flexible policy combining the two criteria mentioned above together. The countries adopt this criterion includes Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, France (more on Jus Sanguinis) and USA, UK, Philippine, Indonesia (more on Jus Soli).
“Dual nationality” is the status in which a person is concurrently regarded as citizen under the laws of more than one state. According to the data provided by multiplecitizenship.com, 74 out of the total 192 countries or regions prohibit dual nationality, which means that 61.5% of the countries or regions permit dual nationality, including USA, Canada, and most European countries.
Historical Background of the Rejection of Dual Nationality
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there passed three nationality laws in history, which are the Law of Nationality of Qing Dynasty (1909), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1912), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1929). All of them recognized dual nationality and treated the overseas Chinese as their legal citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis. One interesting thing is that nowadays Taiwan (the Republic of China) is still issuing passport to overseas Chinese on the basis of the principle of jus sanguinis, irrespective of whether they have lived or even set foot in Taiwan. This policy was considered as a reward for the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia due to their support in anti-Japanese war.
However, after World War II, the Western retreat from Southeast Asia was accompanied by the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. There, nationalism against the west was turned into forces and new citizens could not tolerate any involvement of the foreign nationalism in their newly independent country. The success of the Communist Party in China’s civil war could only make things worse, for some local communities in Southeast Asia suspect the overseas Chinese to be the spies of the Communist China. Moreover, the western countries dominated by the United States also rendered the existence of large populations of overseas Chinese as evidence of the “China Threat”. Severe anti-Chinese movements appeared in Southeast Asia, which not only caused trouble for the overseas Chinese but also became a great obstacle for the New China to build regular relationships with these third-world countries.
After evaluating the situation, CCP government eventually decided to deny the dual nationality and encouraged the overseas Chinese to be involved with local communities and participate in local affairs. In the first Asia-African Conference 1955, which was held in Bandung, Indonesia, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed the Dual treaty with Indonesia, in which Chinese government officially gave up the principle of jus soli and let the overseas Chinese to decide which nationality they want to keep. Although small groups of Chinese chose to return to China or remigrate somewhere else, the majority, however, decided to accept the citizenship in these newly established countries and were determined to make their peace with local nationalism.
The “Migrant Upgrading” of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries
In the past fifty years since the CCP government showed clearly its stance of rejecting dual nationality, great changes have occurred in the minds of the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asian Countries about the perspective of national identity and feeling towards China, especially by the new generation. This change is named “Migrant Upgrading” by Wang Gungwu, the renowned former director of the Institute of the Asian studies in Singapore. In the article Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren, he lists the changing national identities of the overseas Chinese in some specific Southeast Asia countries.
In Thailand, the most thorough and penetrating migrant upgrading happened. There the question of Chinese descent among Thai nationals has been of minimal concern, even in politics and military. There are no Huaqiao left and even the term Huaren, or ethnic Chinese is argued by some as inappropriate. In Singapore, over 75 percent of the population is of Chinese descent, but they are now all Singaporeans, and some even question the need for a term like Huaren. Filipinos include millions of nationals of Chinese and part-Chinese descent, many of whom consider themselves first and foremost Filipinos. Only in non-political and non-military professions and business activities, they will consider the use of Huaren. In Malaysia and Indonesia, although the upgrading is incomplete, the Chinese descent there consider themselves more as ethnic Chinese, or Huaren, rather than the term related to nationality, Huaqiao.
In short, although in different countries the experience of “Migrant Upgrading” is different, generally majority of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia tend to be more involved in their own country’s affairs and have little affinity towards China as a nation.
Two causes may contribute to the “Migrant Upgrading” in this region. One is more integration or assimilation in their adopted nations, caused by various factors such as pragmatic economic benefits and government’s policies.
The other one is less obvious but of significant influence and that is the vagueness of the Chinese culture center after the establishment of PRC. Before 1949, China continuously provides cultural centers at different times and they were Beijing (in Qing dynasty), Nanjing and Shanghai (in Zhonghua MInguo). These cultural centers served as vivid cultural entities to attract the attention of the overseas Chinese and unite them, just like what Mecca is to the Muslims around the world. But after the China’s civil war, the complicated political situation and ideological differences gave rise to the vagueness of the cultural center. Beijing is not the former capital of Qing Empire, but the center of a Communist country, which promotes the complete elimination of the “toxic” Chinese traditional culture. The majority of the overseas Chinese, except for the leftists, felt disappointed in the Communist party. Although in Taiwan the former ROC government still claims its orthodoxy and sovereignty, to many overseas Chinese this island is too small to hold the whole bulk of Chinese culture. To the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, ambiguity of the cultural center aboard was replaced by the overwhelming domestic political and economic issues. Communal struggle and suffering in a stagnant environment with few new immigrants, creates awareness of togetherness and common destiny.
Fifty years can change many things. Nowadays, although they have a desire to preserve their Chineseness, or status of cultural Chinese, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those groups of Huaqiao or Chinese sojourners, who have close relations and perceptions with China as a nation. The new phenomenon of the remigration of these overseas Chinese to North America, Europe and Australia rather than their ancestral homeland, described by Tu Wei-ming as “the transformation from sojourner mentality to deliberate emigration”, is another example for the perplexing feeling of Southeast Asian Chinese towards China.
Thus, if the Chinese government still considers the rejection of dual nationality as a protection to the Southeast Asian Chinese as claimed by its director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, it is far from the correct evaluation of the situation and also of itself, for China as a nation in fact has little influence on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. If we just concentrate on the nationality issue, the influence becomes even smaller, as even if China accept the dual nationality, the one-nationality policy adopted by ASEAN countries inhibits their citizens from getting another nationality.
The Community most Affected by Issues of Dual Nationality
Compared with the old batch of overseas Chinese living in the Southeast Asia, nowadays there is another community of overseas Chinese that is worth the government’s attention. They are the newly immigrated overseas Chinese, mainly made up by the overseas Chinese students after 1978. They urge to see the development of China and since China is where they grow up in, they have more personal connections with this country.
In 1978, the year after Cultural Revolution, the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to send students and scholars overseas for further education each year. With this policy, the Chinese government aimed to rebuild China’s scientific community, which was catastrophically reduced in the Cultural Revolution. However, with China’s booming economy and open-door policy, the 1990s saw a great surge of the self-sponsored Chinese overseas students. In 2002, 117 thousands of self-sponsored students went overseas, making up 94% of the total overseas students for that year. The graph below shows more vividly the increase.
According to one project done by Linqing Yao at the Australian National University, the total population of Chinese overseas students is about 700,000 from 1978 to 2003, among which 527,000 did not return back to China and chose to stay overseas. In order to find out the reasons that contributed to the high percentage of non-returners, a survey was carried out in United States in 1993, which showed that more than 30 per cent of non-returners were concerned about political instability, while another 30 percent emphasized professional problems in China, such as low salaries, poor research facilities and difficulties changing jobs.
Despite the various reasons that let them choose to stay overseas, these groups of Chinese overseas students care about the current development of China much more than the old batch of overseas Chinese. They actively get involved in the activities related to China with the slogan of “Serve the Country without Returning”, and enthusiastically defend China’s image when their country is in trouble. The recent confrontation of the pro-China Chinese students with the pro-Tibet westerners during the Olympic torch relay is a vivid example of the heated nationalism shared among the overseas students. Comparably, the old batch of overseas Chinese, especially Southeast Asia, has less concern for China’s situation. A research project conducted by Prof David Zweig, head of the Center on China’s Transnational Relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, provides plenty of data to show that the overseas Chinese students are “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad” and “a significant proportion of them believe that using force to promote China’s national interest is acceptable”. It is a glaring fact that the large portions of the overseas Chinese students have strong cultural and family ties with the country, and that they are willing to contribute to its development.
However, for pragmatic benefits such as medical insurance and traveling convenience, many overseas Chinese need to acquire another citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new countries. The rejection of dual nationality by the Chinese government gives them the hardship of having to make a choice. They are the ones with a significant psychological bond to China. They are the ones who care most about the dual nationality issue.
Conclusion
On 22 December, 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a bill to accept dual citizenship in order to attract the investment from the 25 million Indian diasporas. On Aug 30, 2008, the Korean government reduced the standard of acquiring the dual citizenship in order to attract more talented overseas Korean and foreigners. Nowadays, more and more governments are aware of the importance of attracting talents and brain-power. The overseas Chinese students form a large pool of overseas human capital. The acceptance of dual nationality can efficiently reduce the effects of a “brain drain” and encourage more overseas Chinese to invest domestically. Besides, the psychological and cultural impact will also be strong, considering the deep-rooted awareness of “root” shared by all the Chinese.
Without a doubt, side effects and negative influences need to be considered to change one policy. But now is the time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the identity of the different groups of overseas Chinese and concentrate on those who have more affinity to China as a nation. We need to admit that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia also had great nationalism for supporting China repulse the Japanese invaders in 1940s. But time has changed and nowadays, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those same groups of Chinese nationalists. They belong to their own countries and are striving for their own rights in their adopted motherland. In contrast, since 1978, the overseas Chinese students have already formed a new group of overseas Chinese, who deserve a reevaluation of China’s policies about dual nationality. Compared with the old batch, they are more aware of China’s development because that is the land where they have grown up in. As the proverb goes, “Chasing two rabbits at the same time will cause both escape!” It is time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the situation and its role in the dual nationality matter in order to make a policy that can most benefit the country and its people.
References:
1. David Zweig and Stanley Rosen, ‘How China Trained a New Generation Abroad’, 2003. At: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html
2. Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles”, Newsweek, Aug 9, 2008
3. David Mozingo. ‘The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty.’ Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 10 (Dec., 1961), p. 25-31
4. “Dual Nationality Called among Overseas Chinese”. At: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/08/content_398383.htm
5. “韩政府将扩大双重国籍拥有对象范围-朝鲜日报”At: http://chn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/08/30/20080830000014.html
6. “华人移民好消息 我国拟承认双重国籍”, At: http://abroad.163.com/editor/immigration/040924/040924_28203.html
7. M.B Hooker, Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. p176
8. “National Law of the Republic of China”. At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_nationality_law#Overseas_Chinese_without_right_of_abode
9. "nationality." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Sep. 2008
10. “Nationality Joy for Overseas Indians” At:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2643149.stm
11. “Not Recognizing Dual Nationality is for the Sake of Most Overseas Compatriots”. At: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/09/eng20050609_189401.html
12. “Proposal submitted for dual nationality”. At: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t187211.htm
13. “双重国籍问题再思考”. At: http://english.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1104065.htm
14. Tu Wei-ming, The Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Beijing Chinese Today, Stanford University Press, 1994. p24
15. Vincent, Andrew (2002). Nationalism and Particularity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. Wang Gungwu. ‘Introduction: Migration and New National Identity.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
17. Wang Gungwu, ‘Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren’, In The Last Half Century of Chinese overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
18. 王庚武. ‘海外华人的文化中心.’移民与崛起中的中国. 新加坡：世界科技出版公司 2005
19. 王辉耀. 海归时代 中国:中央编译出版社 2004
20. 王锦松.’ 中国双重国籍问题探索.’ 联合早报，11 Dec 1997.
21. 蕭成洽. 碩士論文：我國國籍法制與實施現狀之研究 銘傳大學June 2005. P53
22. “一九五五年万隆会议” At: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-26/16501621044.shtml
23. Yao Linqing. The Chinese Overseas Students: an Overview of the Flows Change. The Australian National University, 2004. p1
24. Zhou Nanjing. ‘The Xiao Yucan Principle and its Historical Destiny.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
Sunday, December 9, 2007
Monday, December 3, 2007
my responce to Mr Blackstone on EG1471
thanks, blackstone. sometimes i think this class is a little boring so i want to make it more lively.
however u are a good teacher, but this module limit ur ability. i have a lot of complain about this module, useless, aimless, inane, and waste of time. we really have problems with our english and i do not see this module as that helpful to my english. we have problems with our writing, but the key weakness does not lie on the "strategy of writing". this module limit both the teachers' and the students' ability instead of extending it. i think what we really need is the english way of thinking and the lack of emerge in the english culture. we write in english while thinking in chinese. we speak the terrible accent while ignoring this problem. we know little about shakespear, wordsworth, byron or o henry and know nothing about the english history, tradition and customs while still wanting to write a good english essay.
this seems to be radiculous. I am not referring to u. as i mentioned, u are a good teacher and have a lot more for us to learn. but the so-called scope and the aim of thie module is totally radiculous, which limit ur ability to teach us. I don't know why the so-called english experts are so rigid that they set something they called scope. yes, we can study whithin this or that scope but can we speak english or write essay whithin these so-called scope, and at the end can we also think questions whithin these scopes? i admit a lesson should have its framework of teaching contents due to the limitation of time, but this framework cannot can specified into every class. the stuff that are teaching is just a waste of time, like the editing, like the conprehension, like the outline. these are for what, just for answering the questions in exams, don't u agree with me? who will care about strategy of writing when reading a news report? who will begin with the radiculous outline when writing a blog? some stuff are useful, like the apa style, but why waste the whole two weeks on it? i don't know how to describe a physical process. i don't know how to express my wishes at the english festival, i don't know the english customs. i don't know how to express sorrow and happiness, stress and depression in english. i don't know know the very common english jokes and humor. i don't know how to write a love poem to the girl i like. aren't they are more important communication problems? should they be taught to us in this twice a week module? why setting those rigid nonsense so-called scopes to limit the teacher's ability of teaching and student's ability of asking?
NUS's biggest weakness lies in the rigidness, of both the teachers and the students, which leading directly into the teacher's teaching whithin the scope and student's studying for high marks. University is the center of human knowlege, culture and spirit and it has some holy meaning. But now from what i see, NUS is merely the center of utilitarianism and mammonism, and students are too practical to have a big heart and a holy spirit. this is different from what i think a high-ranking university should be.
perhaps we can attribute this to singapore's cultural shallowness. we can say that singapore is the crossroad of both western and eastern culture but we can also say that singapore is an island without culture. fifty-year-old accumulation of life cannot be called a civilization and a mixture of tea and wine cannot represent either's flavour. since singapore abandon so much as a branch of chinese culture and get so little as a westernised region, it is really a cultural orphan. however, this can also be good for this island, too small to hold a cultural giant, but maybe also too small to hold a world-class university. if NUS really want to improve, my suggestion is not to be influenced by the shallowness of this country.
NUS is my home university. i love it so much, so i may blame it too much. this is my feeling about the first semester in NUS. really hope it can get better and everybody has a good university life.
however u are a good teacher, but this module limit ur ability. i have a lot of complain about this module, useless, aimless, inane, and waste of time. we really have problems with our english and i do not see this module as that helpful to my english. we have problems with our writing, but the key weakness does not lie on the "strategy of writing". this module limit both the teachers' and the students' ability instead of extending it. i think what we really need is the english way of thinking and the lack of emerge in the english culture. we write in english while thinking in chinese. we speak the terrible accent while ignoring this problem. we know little about shakespear, wordsworth, byron or o henry and know nothing about the english history, tradition and customs while still wanting to write a good english essay.
this seems to be radiculous. I am not referring to u. as i mentioned, u are a good teacher and have a lot more for us to learn. but the so-called scope and the aim of thie module is totally radiculous, which limit ur ability to teach us. I don't know why the so-called english experts are so rigid that they set something they called scope. yes, we can study whithin this or that scope but can we speak english or write essay whithin these so-called scope, and at the end can we also think questions whithin these scopes? i admit a lesson should have its framework of teaching contents due to the limitation of time, but this framework cannot can specified into every class. the stuff that are teaching is just a waste of time, like the editing, like the conprehension, like the outline. these are for what, just for answering the questions in exams, don't u agree with me? who will care about strategy of writing when reading a news report? who will begin with the radiculous outline when writing a blog? some stuff are useful, like the apa style, but why waste the whole two weeks on it? i don't know how to describe a physical process. i don't know how to express my wishes at the english festival, i don't know the english customs. i don't know how to express sorrow and happiness, stress and depression in english. i don't know know the very common english jokes and humor. i don't know how to write a love poem to the girl i like. aren't they are more important communication problems? should they be taught to us in this twice a week module? why setting those rigid nonsense so-called scopes to limit the teacher's ability of teaching and student's ability of asking?
NUS's biggest weakness lies in the rigidness, of both the teachers and the students, which leading directly into the teacher's teaching whithin the scope and student's studying for high marks. University is the center of human knowlege, culture and spirit and it has some holy meaning. But now from what i see, NUS is merely the center of utilitarianism and mammonism, and students are too practical to have a big heart and a holy spirit. this is different from what i think a high-ranking university should be.
perhaps we can attribute this to singapore's cultural shallowness. we can say that singapore is the crossroad of both western and eastern culture but we can also say that singapore is an island without culture. fifty-year-old accumulation of life cannot be called a civilization and a mixture of tea and wine cannot represent either's flavour. since singapore abandon so much as a branch of chinese culture and get so little as a westernised region, it is really a cultural orphan. however, this can also be good for this island, too small to hold a cultural giant, but maybe also too small to hold a world-class university. if NUS really want to improve, my suggestion is not to be influenced by the shallowness of this country.
NUS is my home university. i love it so much, so i may blame it too much. this is my feeling about the first semester in NUS. really hope it can get better and everybody has a good university life.
Sunday, November 11, 2007
hallelujah
I read some msn spaces written by my seniors just now. I really admire their lives in the past years. Many of them have been to the US or Europe for travelling. Some of them got opportunities to international competitions and won the prize. A few even went to the UC berkeley, Stanford, Yale to study. For their experience, I find that life in NUS can be so interesting and colorful. Yes, perhaps I also have this chance to experience a lot, but often I cannot be that excited. I think of myself to be a person of two different personalities. When I am in a high mood, I think of everything in the positive side and I feel that life is that wonderful. But when i am down, things will be quite different. I will force myself to be sad, to complain the ambient and to sigh for my poor life. I can be happy and artless as a child and be pessimistic and serious as an aged.
And now i find that life needs not to be that rigid and tough. Change the attitude and life is that fantastic. I should cheer that I have the opportunity to study in univeristy. I should cheer that I am quite healthy and can manage myself everywhere i want. I should cheer that I am still young compared to the teachers and I still have so much time and space to improve my ability and build my future. And also I should cheer that there is still two weeks to go before the final exams. Whithin these two weeks, I can do something and make a difference.
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
LIFE IS COLORFUL AND EVERY MINUTE IS ENJOYABLE.
And now i find that life needs not to be that rigid and tough. Change the attitude and life is that fantastic. I should cheer that I have the opportunity to study in univeristy. I should cheer that I am quite healthy and can manage myself everywhere i want. I should cheer that I am still young compared to the teachers and I still have so much time and space to improve my ability and build my future. And also I should cheer that there is still two weeks to go before the final exams. Whithin these two weeks, I can do something and make a difference.
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
LIFE IS COLORFUL AND EVERY MINUTE IS ENJOYABLE.
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Thinking from Luo Dayou
Just now i listen to a few songs composed by Luo Dayou(罗大佑) through the youtube website. I got quite moved after listening to these songs. Among these songs i like the old ones most, like "Green Island Nocturne(绿岛小夜曲)", "Flower in the sea(海上花)"，"Asia's Orphan(亚细亚的孤儿)"，"The children on the earth(大地上的孤儿)"，and the "the owner of the future(未来的主人翁)". These songs are all composed from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, when the Taiwan Island is experiencing its non-stability of societies and politics. During the rein of Kuomintang Party, people were under pressure of the dictatorial Kuomintang Party and claimed for a more democratic political system. The "Green island Nocturne" expressed the sadness and loneliness of the warrior jailed in prison because of the struggle for democracy. The "Flower in the sea" expressed the composer's love for this small island. The other songs expressed Luo Dayou's hope for the future and sadness about the reality.
Praised as the godfather of the modern Taiwan pop songs, Luo Dayou really played an important part in the history of both music and culture of this island. His songs influenced a whole generation of Chinese youths both in Chinese mainland and Taiwan island. In his songs, i can make sense of his loyalty to China and homesick to the Chinese mainland. He is a Chinese rather than the so-called Taiwanese. His heart is forever pointing to the mainland although maybe he does not like the rule of the communist party.
For a long time, i think Taiwan is an westernized island like Singapore, without soul and real culture. But with more understanding of this island after moving to Singapore, i have enough confidence to say that the Chinese culture remains better in Taiwan than the mainland, especially those people who were born before the 1970s. The real Chinese culture is one without the influence of the culture of Parties, or politics. The real Chinese culture lies in Changjiang River rather than Dadu River, in the Tai Mountain rather than Jinggang Mountain, in the Confucius rather than Karl Marx, in the Classic books of those ancient thinkers rather than the red book of Chairman Mao.As an authentic Chinese intellect, i never hide my deep love to my motherland, including Taiwan of course. But sometimes i think that will it work that just claiming Taiwan is part of China and doing nothing else, is it that important that Taiwan must be dominated by the central government of Beijing, and is it a better situation when the two government in Beijing and Taibei both work for the progress of our ONE CHINA and maybe can get experience from each other.
Since people in that island are also our brothers and sisters, we all have the responsibility to have a good understanding of this island. Our words are of no sense if we say without knowing, and this understanding is what the youth in mainland lack of.
Through Luo Dayou's songs, we share the sorrow, the happiness, the hope and the anticipation. We speak the same language. We celebrate the same festivals. We are proud of the same culture. We have gone through the same great and also humiliating history. And above all, we have the same root and feeling. We can make sense of each other's writing and music, and mercy the tribulation, and pray the bright future for each other.
There is an old Chinese saying, "Blood is thicker than water". We are one together and the blood during the anti-japanese war has proven our brotherhood. I cannot predict the future but i really wish the peaceful development of the whole China and every Chinese has a happy life.
Sunday, September 30, 2007
rerevised Mao and Zhou
Both as one of the founders of People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were two world-known political leaders. Simultaneously, Mao and Zhou were also famous for their different personalities or emotional intelligence as Chairman Mao was like a hawk, which was strong-willed, decisive and perseverant while Premier Zhou was like a pigeon, which was moderate, considerate and flexible.Coming from two different family backgrounds, these two political figures developed their distinguished personalities at a very young age. As a son of kulak, Mao developed his sense of revolution during his struggle with his father, who was a typical Chinese small landlord with discrimination to the poor peasants. Comparably, Zhou was from a family of traditional intellects where his father, mother, uncles were all famous intellects in his hometown. In this bookish environment, Zhou developed his gentlemanship and modest characteristic.
There is one case that can show the differences of their emotional intelligence clearly. After the Great Leap and the natural disasters lasting three years from 1959 to 1961, China experienced a serious famine which caused a lot of starving. Although Chairman Mao also did some self-criticism at that time, he still believed that the policies he proposed before would eventually and non-alternatively lead the Chinese to happy lives and attributed the situation partly to the incompleteness during the execution of the policy. Meanwhile, Premier Zhou cared more about the contemporary tribulation people suffered and would like to change the policies immediately which were the ultimate causes of the suffering.
From their behavior at the foreign affairs, we can also see the difference. Chairman Mao was famous for his assertive arguments to show the independence and sovereignty of the new China, which would sometimes cause the misunderstanding of the outside. Conversely, Premier Zhou was famous for his gentleness and tact in the diplomatic stages, which earned him a great reputation as a diplomat.
Although Mao and Zhou are different in terms of their emotional intelligence, this difference does not obstruct them from being great men, which reminds me of one idiom “All roads lead to Rome”.
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