The conquerors tried to superimpose their ideas and culture on the previous ones of the gown, but did not succeed.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
The Issue of Dual Nationality in Contemporary China
The Issue of Dual Nationality in Contemporary China
by Dong Hao
UCV2206 Chinese Thought and Culture
Sep 2008
In recent years, many newly immigrated overseas Chinese have been calling for dual nationality so that they can keep their Chinese citizenship while obtaining a foreign one. According to one survey by the torontoservice.com website and the North Chinese Community of Canada in 2003, 92.6% of the overseas Chinese thought that if the Chinese government accepted the dual citizenship, they would retain their Chinese citizenship. These newly immigrated Chinese were in a dilemma. On one hand, they do not want to cut off their connection with their cultural root in China; on the other hand, for pragmatic reasons, they need to accept a foreign citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new country.
In 2005, the China Democratic National Construction Association submitted a proposal to the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top advisory body, to suggest the acceptance of dual nationality by the government. However, these efforts did not change the CCP government’s policy regarding dual nationality. “China does not recognize dual nationality because the country cares for the interests of the majority of the overseas Chinese (referred to overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia)” , said Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. However, in order to understand why PRC set this kind of policy, we need to understand as well the historical context in which this policy was made. This article argues that due to the great change in the perception of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia towards China as a nation, it is more practical for the Chinese government to consider more about the pursuit of those newly immigrated Chinese, especially that of Chinese overseas students.
A short introduction of Nationality Law
“Nationality” is defined as “Condition or status of belonging to, or having legality with a nation or state” by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In Encyclopedia Britannica, “nationality” is described simply as “By law, a membership in one nation or sovereign state” Nowadays, different countries grant nationality based on different criteria, which can be categorized mainly into three.
1. Jus soli (birthright citizenship), is a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state. The countries adopting this criterion include Canada, India, Australia, Argentina, and Chile.
2. Jus Sanguinis (blood citizenship), is a social policy by which nationality or citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who is a national or citizen of the state. The countries adopting this criterion include Germany, Australia, Romania, Egypt and Russia.
3. Mixed criterion, is a flexible policy combining the two criteria mentioned above together. The countries adopt this criterion includes Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, France (more on Jus Sanguinis) and USA, UK, Philippine, Indonesia (more on Jus Soli).
“Dual nationality” is the status in which a person is concurrently regarded as citizen under the laws of more than one state. According to the data provided by multiplecitizenship.com, 74 out of the total 192 countries or regions prohibit dual nationality, which means that 61.5% of the countries or regions permit dual nationality, including USA, Canada, and most European countries.
Historical Background of the Rejection of Dual Nationality
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there passed three nationality laws in history, which are the Law of Nationality of Qing Dynasty (1909), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1912), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1929). All of them recognized dual nationality and treated the overseas Chinese as their legal citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis. One interesting thing is that nowadays Taiwan (the Republic of China) is still issuing passport to overseas Chinese on the basis of the principle of jus sanguinis, irrespective of whether they have lived or even set foot in Taiwan. This policy was considered as a reward for the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia due to their support in anti-Japanese war.
However, after World War II, the Western retreat from Southeast Asia was accompanied by the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. There, nationalism against the west was turned into forces and new citizens could not tolerate any involvement of the foreign nationalism in their newly independent country. The success of the Communist Party in China’s civil war could only make things worse, for some local communities in Southeast Asia suspect the overseas Chinese to be the spies of the Communist China. Moreover, the western countries dominated by the United States also rendered the existence of large populations of overseas Chinese as evidence of the “China Threat”. Severe anti-Chinese movements appeared in Southeast Asia, which not only caused trouble for the overseas Chinese but also became a great obstacle for the New China to build regular relationships with these third-world countries.
After evaluating the situation, CCP government eventually decided to deny the dual nationality and encouraged the overseas Chinese to be involved with local communities and participate in local affairs. In the first Asia-African Conference 1955, which was held in Bandung, Indonesia, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed the Dual treaty with Indonesia, in which Chinese government officially gave up the principle of jus soli and let the overseas Chinese to decide which nationality they want to keep. Although small groups of Chinese chose to return to China or remigrate somewhere else, the majority, however, decided to accept the citizenship in these newly established countries and were determined to make their peace with local nationalism.
The “Migrant Upgrading” of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries
In the past fifty years since the CCP government showed clearly its stance of rejecting dual nationality, great changes have occurred in the minds of the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asian Countries about the perspective of national identity and feeling towards China, especially by the new generation. This change is named “Migrant Upgrading” by Wang Gungwu, the renowned former director of the Institute of the Asian studies in Singapore. In the article Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren, he lists the changing national identities of the overseas Chinese in some specific Southeast Asia countries.
In Thailand, the most thorough and penetrating migrant upgrading happened. There the question of Chinese descent among Thai nationals has been of minimal concern, even in politics and military. There are no Huaqiao left and even the term Huaren, or ethnic Chinese is argued by some as inappropriate. In Singapore, over 75 percent of the population is of Chinese descent, but they are now all Singaporeans, and some even question the need for a term like Huaren. Filipinos include millions of nationals of Chinese and part-Chinese descent, many of whom consider themselves first and foremost Filipinos. Only in non-political and non-military professions and business activities, they will consider the use of Huaren. In Malaysia and Indonesia, although the upgrading is incomplete, the Chinese descent there consider themselves more as ethnic Chinese, or Huaren, rather than the term related to nationality, Huaqiao.
In short, although in different countries the experience of “Migrant Upgrading” is different, generally majority of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia tend to be more involved in their own country’s affairs and have little affinity towards China as a nation.
Two causes may contribute to the “Migrant Upgrading” in this region. One is more integration or assimilation in their adopted nations, caused by various factors such as pragmatic economic benefits and government’s policies.
The other one is less obvious but of significant influence and that is the vagueness of the Chinese culture center after the establishment of PRC. Before 1949, China continuously provides cultural centers at different times and they were Beijing (in Qing dynasty), Nanjing and Shanghai (in Zhonghua MInguo). These cultural centers served as vivid cultural entities to attract the attention of the overseas Chinese and unite them, just like what Mecca is to the Muslims around the world. But after the China’s civil war, the complicated political situation and ideological differences gave rise to the vagueness of the cultural center. Beijing is not the former capital of Qing Empire, but the center of a Communist country, which promotes the complete elimination of the “toxic” Chinese traditional culture. The majority of the overseas Chinese, except for the leftists, felt disappointed in the Communist party. Although in Taiwan the former ROC government still claims its orthodoxy and sovereignty, to many overseas Chinese this island is too small to hold the whole bulk of Chinese culture. To the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, ambiguity of the cultural center aboard was replaced by the overwhelming domestic political and economic issues. Communal struggle and suffering in a stagnant environment with few new immigrants, creates awareness of togetherness and common destiny.
Fifty years can change many things. Nowadays, although they have a desire to preserve their Chineseness, or status of cultural Chinese, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those groups of Huaqiao or Chinese sojourners, who have close relations and perceptions with China as a nation. The new phenomenon of the remigration of these overseas Chinese to North America, Europe and Australia rather than their ancestral homeland, described by Tu Wei-ming as “the transformation from sojourner mentality to deliberate emigration”, is another example for the perplexing feeling of Southeast Asian Chinese towards China.
Thus, if the Chinese government still considers the rejection of dual nationality as a protection to the Southeast Asian Chinese as claimed by its director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, it is far from the correct evaluation of the situation and also of itself, for China as a nation in fact has little influence on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. If we just concentrate on the nationality issue, the influence becomes even smaller, as even if China accept the dual nationality, the one-nationality policy adopted by ASEAN countries inhibits their citizens from getting another nationality.
The Community most Affected by Issues of Dual Nationality
Compared with the old batch of overseas Chinese living in the Southeast Asia, nowadays there is another community of overseas Chinese that is worth the government’s attention. They are the newly immigrated overseas Chinese, mainly made up by the overseas Chinese students after 1978. They urge to see the development of China and since China is where they grow up in, they have more personal connections with this country.
In 1978, the year after Cultural Revolution, the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to send students and scholars overseas for further education each year. With this policy, the Chinese government aimed to rebuild China’s scientific community, which was catastrophically reduced in the Cultural Revolution. However, with China’s booming economy and open-door policy, the 1990s saw a great surge of the self-sponsored Chinese overseas students. In 2002, 117 thousands of self-sponsored students went overseas, making up 94% of the total overseas students for that year. The graph below shows more vividly the increase.
According to one project done by Linqing Yao at the Australian National University, the total population of Chinese overseas students is about 700,000 from 1978 to 2003, among which 527,000 did not return back to China and chose to stay overseas. In order to find out the reasons that contributed to the high percentage of non-returners, a survey was carried out in United States in 1993, which showed that more than 30 per cent of non-returners were concerned about political instability, while another 30 percent emphasized professional problems in China, such as low salaries, poor research facilities and difficulties changing jobs.
Despite the various reasons that let them choose to stay overseas, these groups of Chinese overseas students care about the current development of China much more than the old batch of overseas Chinese. They actively get involved in the activities related to China with the slogan of “Serve the Country without Returning”, and enthusiastically defend China’s image when their country is in trouble. The recent confrontation of the pro-China Chinese students with the pro-Tibet westerners during the Olympic torch relay is a vivid example of the heated nationalism shared among the overseas students. Comparably, the old batch of overseas Chinese, especially Southeast Asia, has less concern for China’s situation. A research project conducted by Prof David Zweig, head of the Center on China’s Transnational Relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, provides plenty of data to show that the overseas Chinese students are “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad” and “a significant proportion of them believe that using force to promote China’s national interest is acceptable”. It is a glaring fact that the large portions of the overseas Chinese students have strong cultural and family ties with the country, and that they are willing to contribute to its development.
However, for pragmatic benefits such as medical insurance and traveling convenience, many overseas Chinese need to acquire another citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new countries. The rejection of dual nationality by the Chinese government gives them the hardship of having to make a choice. They are the ones with a significant psychological bond to China. They are the ones who care most about the dual nationality issue.
Conclusion
On 22 December, 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a bill to accept dual citizenship in order to attract the investment from the 25 million Indian diasporas. On Aug 30, 2008, the Korean government reduced the standard of acquiring the dual citizenship in order to attract more talented overseas Korean and foreigners. Nowadays, more and more governments are aware of the importance of attracting talents and brain-power. The overseas Chinese students form a large pool of overseas human capital. The acceptance of dual nationality can efficiently reduce the effects of a “brain drain” and encourage more overseas Chinese to invest domestically. Besides, the psychological and cultural impact will also be strong, considering the deep-rooted awareness of “root” shared by all the Chinese.
Without a doubt, side effects and negative influences need to be considered to change one policy. But now is the time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the identity of the different groups of overseas Chinese and concentrate on those who have more affinity to China as a nation. We need to admit that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia also had great nationalism for supporting China repulse the Japanese invaders in 1940s. But time has changed and nowadays, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those same groups of Chinese nationalists. They belong to their own countries and are striving for their own rights in their adopted motherland. In contrast, since 1978, the overseas Chinese students have already formed a new group of overseas Chinese, who deserve a reevaluation of China’s policies about dual nationality. Compared with the old batch, they are more aware of China’s development because that is the land where they have grown up in. As the proverb goes, “Chasing two rabbits at the same time will cause both escape!” It is time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the situation and its role in the dual nationality matter in order to make a policy that can most benefit the country and its people.
References:
1. David Zweig and Stanley Rosen, ‘How China Trained a New Generation Abroad’, 2003. At: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html
2. Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles”, Newsweek, Aug 9, 2008
3. David Mozingo. ‘The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty.’ Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 10 (Dec., 1961), p. 25-31
4. “Dual Nationality Called among Overseas Chinese”. At: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/08/content_398383.htm
5. “韩政府将扩大双重国籍拥有对象范围-朝鲜日报”At: http://chn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/08/30/20080830000014.html
6. “华人移民好消息 我国拟承认双重国籍”, At: http://abroad.163.com/editor/immigration/040924/040924_28203.html
7. M.B Hooker, Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. p176
8. “National Law of the Republic of China”. At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_nationality_law#Overseas_Chinese_without_right_of_abode
9. "nationality." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Sep. 2008
10. “Nationality Joy for Overseas Indians” At:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2643149.stm
11. “Not Recognizing Dual Nationality is for the Sake of Most Overseas Compatriots”. At: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/09/eng20050609_189401.html
12. “Proposal submitted for dual nationality”. At: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t187211.htm
13. “双重国籍问题再思考”. At: http://english.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1104065.htm
14. Tu Wei-ming, The Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Beijing Chinese Today, Stanford University Press, 1994. p24
15. Vincent, Andrew (2002). Nationalism and Particularity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. Wang Gungwu. ‘Introduction: Migration and New National Identity.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
17. Wang Gungwu, ‘Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren’, In The Last Half Century of Chinese overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
18. 王庚武. ‘海外华人的文化中心.’移民与崛起中的中国. 新加坡：世界科技出版公司 2005
19. 王辉耀. 海归时代 中国:中央编译出版社 2004
20. 王锦松.’ 中国双重国籍问题探索.’ 联合早报，11 Dec 1997.
21. 蕭成洽. 碩士論文：我國國籍法制與實施現狀之研究 銘傳大學June 2005. P53
22. “一九五五年万隆会议” At: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-26/16501621044.shtml
23. Yao Linqing. The Chinese Overseas Students: an Overview of the Flows Change. The Australian National University, 2004. p1
24. Zhou Nanjing. ‘The Xiao Yucan Principle and its Historical Destiny.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
by Dong Hao
UCV2206 Chinese Thought and Culture
Sep 2008
In recent years, many newly immigrated overseas Chinese have been calling for dual nationality so that they can keep their Chinese citizenship while obtaining a foreign one. According to one survey by the torontoservice.com website and the North Chinese Community of Canada in 2003, 92.6% of the overseas Chinese thought that if the Chinese government accepted the dual citizenship, they would retain their Chinese citizenship. These newly immigrated Chinese were in a dilemma. On one hand, they do not want to cut off their connection with their cultural root in China; on the other hand, for pragmatic reasons, they need to accept a foreign citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new country.
In 2005, the China Democratic National Construction Association submitted a proposal to the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top advisory body, to suggest the acceptance of dual nationality by the government. However, these efforts did not change the CCP government’s policy regarding dual nationality. “China does not recognize dual nationality because the country cares for the interests of the majority of the overseas Chinese (referred to overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia)” , said Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. However, in order to understand why PRC set this kind of policy, we need to understand as well the historical context in which this policy was made. This article argues that due to the great change in the perception of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia towards China as a nation, it is more practical for the Chinese government to consider more about the pursuit of those newly immigrated Chinese, especially that of Chinese overseas students.
A short introduction of Nationality Law
“Nationality” is defined as “Condition or status of belonging to, or having legality with a nation or state” by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In Encyclopedia Britannica, “nationality” is described simply as “By law, a membership in one nation or sovereign state” Nowadays, different countries grant nationality based on different criteria, which can be categorized mainly into three.
1. Jus soli (birthright citizenship), is a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state. The countries adopting this criterion include Canada, India, Australia, Argentina, and Chile.
2. Jus Sanguinis (blood citizenship), is a social policy by which nationality or citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who is a national or citizen of the state. The countries adopting this criterion include Germany, Australia, Romania, Egypt and Russia.
3. Mixed criterion, is a flexible policy combining the two criteria mentioned above together. The countries adopt this criterion includes Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, France (more on Jus Sanguinis) and USA, UK, Philippine, Indonesia (more on Jus Soli).
“Dual nationality” is the status in which a person is concurrently regarded as citizen under the laws of more than one state. According to the data provided by multiplecitizenship.com, 74 out of the total 192 countries or regions prohibit dual nationality, which means that 61.5% of the countries or regions permit dual nationality, including USA, Canada, and most European countries.
Historical Background of the Rejection of Dual Nationality
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there passed three nationality laws in history, which are the Law of Nationality of Qing Dynasty (1909), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1912), the Law of Nationality of Republic of China (1929). All of them recognized dual nationality and treated the overseas Chinese as their legal citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis. One interesting thing is that nowadays Taiwan (the Republic of China) is still issuing passport to overseas Chinese on the basis of the principle of jus sanguinis, irrespective of whether they have lived or even set foot in Taiwan. This policy was considered as a reward for the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia due to their support in anti-Japanese war.
However, after World War II, the Western retreat from Southeast Asia was accompanied by the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. There, nationalism against the west was turned into forces and new citizens could not tolerate any involvement of the foreign nationalism in their newly independent country. The success of the Communist Party in China’s civil war could only make things worse, for some local communities in Southeast Asia suspect the overseas Chinese to be the spies of the Communist China. Moreover, the western countries dominated by the United States also rendered the existence of large populations of overseas Chinese as evidence of the “China Threat”. Severe anti-Chinese movements appeared in Southeast Asia, which not only caused trouble for the overseas Chinese but also became a great obstacle for the New China to build regular relationships with these third-world countries.
After evaluating the situation, CCP government eventually decided to deny the dual nationality and encouraged the overseas Chinese to be involved with local communities and participate in local affairs. In the first Asia-African Conference 1955, which was held in Bandung, Indonesia, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed the Dual treaty with Indonesia, in which Chinese government officially gave up the principle of jus soli and let the overseas Chinese to decide which nationality they want to keep. Although small groups of Chinese chose to return to China or remigrate somewhere else, the majority, however, decided to accept the citizenship in these newly established countries and were determined to make their peace with local nationalism.
The “Migrant Upgrading” of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries
In the past fifty years since the CCP government showed clearly its stance of rejecting dual nationality, great changes have occurred in the minds of the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asian Countries about the perspective of national identity and feeling towards China, especially by the new generation. This change is named “Migrant Upgrading” by Wang Gungwu, the renowned former director of the Institute of the Asian studies in Singapore. In the article Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren, he lists the changing national identities of the overseas Chinese in some specific Southeast Asia countries.
In Thailand, the most thorough and penetrating migrant upgrading happened. There the question of Chinese descent among Thai nationals has been of minimal concern, even in politics and military. There are no Huaqiao left and even the term Huaren, or ethnic Chinese is argued by some as inappropriate. In Singapore, over 75 percent of the population is of Chinese descent, but they are now all Singaporeans, and some even question the need for a term like Huaren. Filipinos include millions of nationals of Chinese and part-Chinese descent, many of whom consider themselves first and foremost Filipinos. Only in non-political and non-military professions and business activities, they will consider the use of Huaren. In Malaysia and Indonesia, although the upgrading is incomplete, the Chinese descent there consider themselves more as ethnic Chinese, or Huaren, rather than the term related to nationality, Huaqiao.
In short, although in different countries the experience of “Migrant Upgrading” is different, generally majority of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia tend to be more involved in their own country’s affairs and have little affinity towards China as a nation.
Two causes may contribute to the “Migrant Upgrading” in this region. One is more integration or assimilation in their adopted nations, caused by various factors such as pragmatic economic benefits and government’s policies.
The other one is less obvious but of significant influence and that is the vagueness of the Chinese culture center after the establishment of PRC. Before 1949, China continuously provides cultural centers at different times and they were Beijing (in Qing dynasty), Nanjing and Shanghai (in Zhonghua MInguo). These cultural centers served as vivid cultural entities to attract the attention of the overseas Chinese and unite them, just like what Mecca is to the Muslims around the world. But after the China’s civil war, the complicated political situation and ideological differences gave rise to the vagueness of the cultural center. Beijing is not the former capital of Qing Empire, but the center of a Communist country, which promotes the complete elimination of the “toxic” Chinese traditional culture. The majority of the overseas Chinese, except for the leftists, felt disappointed in the Communist party. Although in Taiwan the former ROC government still claims its orthodoxy and sovereignty, to many overseas Chinese this island is too small to hold the whole bulk of Chinese culture. To the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, ambiguity of the cultural center aboard was replaced by the overwhelming domestic political and economic issues. Communal struggle and suffering in a stagnant environment with few new immigrants, creates awareness of togetherness and common destiny.
Fifty years can change many things. Nowadays, although they have a desire to preserve their Chineseness, or status of cultural Chinese, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those groups of Huaqiao or Chinese sojourners, who have close relations and perceptions with China as a nation. The new phenomenon of the remigration of these overseas Chinese to North America, Europe and Australia rather than their ancestral homeland, described by Tu Wei-ming as “the transformation from sojourner mentality to deliberate emigration”, is another example for the perplexing feeling of Southeast Asian Chinese towards China.
Thus, if the Chinese government still considers the rejection of dual nationality as a protection to the Southeast Asian Chinese as claimed by its director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, it is far from the correct evaluation of the situation and also of itself, for China as a nation in fact has little influence on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. If we just concentrate on the nationality issue, the influence becomes even smaller, as even if China accept the dual nationality, the one-nationality policy adopted by ASEAN countries inhibits their citizens from getting another nationality.
The Community most Affected by Issues of Dual Nationality
Compared with the old batch of overseas Chinese living in the Southeast Asia, nowadays there is another community of overseas Chinese that is worth the government’s attention. They are the newly immigrated overseas Chinese, mainly made up by the overseas Chinese students after 1978. They urge to see the development of China and since China is where they grow up in, they have more personal connections with this country.
In 1978, the year after Cultural Revolution, the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to send students and scholars overseas for further education each year. With this policy, the Chinese government aimed to rebuild China’s scientific community, which was catastrophically reduced in the Cultural Revolution. However, with China’s booming economy and open-door policy, the 1990s saw a great surge of the self-sponsored Chinese overseas students. In 2002, 117 thousands of self-sponsored students went overseas, making up 94% of the total overseas students for that year. The graph below shows more vividly the increase.
According to one project done by Linqing Yao at the Australian National University, the total population of Chinese overseas students is about 700,000 from 1978 to 2003, among which 527,000 did not return back to China and chose to stay overseas. In order to find out the reasons that contributed to the high percentage of non-returners, a survey was carried out in United States in 1993, which showed that more than 30 per cent of non-returners were concerned about political instability, while another 30 percent emphasized professional problems in China, such as low salaries, poor research facilities and difficulties changing jobs.
Despite the various reasons that let them choose to stay overseas, these groups of Chinese overseas students care about the current development of China much more than the old batch of overseas Chinese. They actively get involved in the activities related to China with the slogan of “Serve the Country without Returning”, and enthusiastically defend China’s image when their country is in trouble. The recent confrontation of the pro-China Chinese students with the pro-Tibet westerners during the Olympic torch relay is a vivid example of the heated nationalism shared among the overseas students. Comparably, the old batch of overseas Chinese, especially Southeast Asia, has less concern for China’s situation. A research project conducted by Prof David Zweig, head of the Center on China’s Transnational Relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, provides plenty of data to show that the overseas Chinese students are “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad” and “a significant proportion of them believe that using force to promote China’s national interest is acceptable”. It is a glaring fact that the large portions of the overseas Chinese students have strong cultural and family ties with the country, and that they are willing to contribute to its development.
However, for pragmatic benefits such as medical insurance and traveling convenience, many overseas Chinese need to acquire another citizenship in order to survive and prosper in the new countries. The rejection of dual nationality by the Chinese government gives them the hardship of having to make a choice. They are the ones with a significant psychological bond to China. They are the ones who care most about the dual nationality issue.
Conclusion
On 22 December, 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a bill to accept dual citizenship in order to attract the investment from the 25 million Indian diasporas. On Aug 30, 2008, the Korean government reduced the standard of acquiring the dual citizenship in order to attract more talented overseas Korean and foreigners. Nowadays, more and more governments are aware of the importance of attracting talents and brain-power. The overseas Chinese students form a large pool of overseas human capital. The acceptance of dual nationality can efficiently reduce the effects of a “brain drain” and encourage more overseas Chinese to invest domestically. Besides, the psychological and cultural impact will also be strong, considering the deep-rooted awareness of “root” shared by all the Chinese.
Without a doubt, side effects and negative influences need to be considered to change one policy. But now is the time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the identity of the different groups of overseas Chinese and concentrate on those who have more affinity to China as a nation. We need to admit that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia also had great nationalism for supporting China repulse the Japanese invaders in 1940s. But time has changed and nowadays, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are no longer those same groups of Chinese nationalists. They belong to their own countries and are striving for their own rights in their adopted motherland. In contrast, since 1978, the overseas Chinese students have already formed a new group of overseas Chinese, who deserve a reevaluation of China’s policies about dual nationality. Compared with the old batch, they are more aware of China’s development because that is the land where they have grown up in. As the proverb goes, “Chasing two rabbits at the same time will cause both escape!” It is time for the Chinese government to reevaluate the situation and its role in the dual nationality matter in order to make a policy that can most benefit the country and its people.
References:
1. David Zweig and Stanley Rosen, ‘How China Trained a New Generation Abroad’, 2003. At: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html
2. Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles”, Newsweek, Aug 9, 2008
3. David Mozingo. ‘The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty.’ Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 10 (Dec., 1961), p. 25-31
4. “Dual Nationality Called among Overseas Chinese”. At: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/08/content_398383.htm
5. “韩政府将扩大双重国籍拥有对象范围-朝鲜日报”At: http://chn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/08/30/20080830000014.html
6. “华人移民好消息 我国拟承认双重国籍”, At: http://abroad.163.com/editor/immigration/040924/040924_28203.html
7. M.B Hooker, Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. p176
8. “National Law of the Republic of China”. At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_nationality_law#Overseas_Chinese_without_right_of_abode
9. "nationality." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Sep. 2008
10. “Nationality Joy for Overseas Indians” At:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2643149.stm
11. “Not Recognizing Dual Nationality is for the Sake of Most Overseas Compatriots”. At: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/09/eng20050609_189401.html
12. “Proposal submitted for dual nationality”. At: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t187211.htm
13. “双重国籍问题再思考”. At: http://english.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1104065.htm
14. Tu Wei-ming, The Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Beijing Chinese Today, Stanford University Press, 1994. p24
15. Vincent, Andrew (2002). Nationalism and Particularity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. Wang Gungwu. ‘Introduction: Migration and New National Identity.’ In The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998.
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